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Cleared For Landing: Airbus, Boeing, 
and the WTO Dispute over Subsidies 




Abstract: Competition between Airbus and Boeing in the large civil aircraft 
industry grew contentious as Airbus began to overtake Boeing in its long-held 
position as the world‘s leading producer of large civil aircraft.  Airbus and 
Boeing had also each embarked on multi-billion dollar investments into the 
development of new aircraft, further raising the stakes.  The United States and 
European Communities in turn increasingly scrutinized the subsidies provided 
by their counterpart to its respective aircraft manufacturer.  This conflict over 
subsidies, which had persisted between the United States and European 
Communities since the inception of Airbus in 1970, reached a head in 2004 
when the United States initiated the dispute resolution process of the World 
Trade Organization over subsidies provided by the European Communities to 
Airbus.  The European Communities responded by filing a parallel complaint 
regarding subsidies provided to Boeing by the United States. 
After over eight years, the dispute is reaching the conclusion of the WTO dispute 
resolution process, but whether or how the process will resolve the dispute is 
still very much in question.  More important, though, is how the instant dispute 
will affect the long-term question of the permissibility of subsidies in the large 
civil aircraft market.  The history of the dispute suggests that the parties will 
negotiate an agreement addressing their short-term interests but setting the 
stage for another conflict down the road.  Instead, the parties should use the 
information and bargaining positions provided through the WTO process to 
negotiate a comprehensive agreement eliminating subsidies to the maximum 
extent possible.  This should protect the parties‘ immediate interests, avoid the 
prospect of a trade war, further free trade generally, and provide a framework 
applicable to the large civil aircraft industry as a whole, including its emerging 
participants. 
 
* J.D., 2012, Northwestern University School of Law. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the fall of 2004, as competition in the already highly competitive 
industry of commercial aircraft escalated between Airbus and Boeing, each 
with a revolutionary new aircraft under development, the dispute between 
the European Communities (EC) and the United States over subsidies given 
to the respective organizations came to a head.  On October 6, 2004, the 
United States unilaterally renounced a trade agreement between the two 
parties and initiated the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute 
resolution process, alleging that the EC violated international trade 
agreements, primarily by giving launch aid to Airbus.
1
  That same day, the 
 
1 Nils Meier-Kaienburg, The WTO‘s ―Toughest‖ Case: An Examination of the 
Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Resolution Procedure in the Airbus–Boeing Dispute Over 
Aircraft Subsidies, 71 J AIR L. & COM. 191, 201, 205 (2006); Request for Consultations by 
the United States, European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting 
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EC filed a separate complaint in the WTO against the United States, 
alleging that Boeing received prohibited government subsidies in the form 
of tax breaks and preferential government contracts.
2
  At that time, the 
dispute was expected to be the biggest and most expensive ever heard under 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).
3
 
Over eight years later, the dispute resolution process is still not 





stages, and both parties have claimed compliance with the findings.
6
  
Predictably, those claims have been vigorously contested, spawning 
additional panel and potentially appellate proceedings to determine whether 
the parties have complied with the WTO‘s findings and removed the 
adverse effects of their subsidies.
7
  This enforcement stage could still drag 
on for some time, and even then, the conclusion of the WTO process could 
be just the first step in resolving the underlying issues.  This dispute, which 
has festered since Airbus was created in 1970 specifically to compete with 
the American aircraft industry, has been a particular challenge so far for the 
WTO, and the effect the WTO process will have on efforts to resolve the 
 
Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/1 (Oct. 6, 2004) [hereinafter DS316 Request for 
Consultations]. 
2 Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 1, at 207; Request for Consultations by the European 
Communities, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 
WT/DS317/1 (Oct. 6, 2004) [hereinafter DS317 Request for Consultations]. 
3 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].  Peter Mandelson, the EU Trade Commissioner, responded 
to the United States‘ initiation of the DSU by saying ―America‘s decision will, I fear, spark 
probably the biggest, most difficult and costly legal dispute in the WTO‘s history.‖  David 
Gow, Snubbed Mandelson Takes Boeing Fight to WTO, GUARDIAN (May, 31, 2005, 7:05 
PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2005/jun/01/europeanunion.theairlineindustry. 
4 Panel Report, European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting 
Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/R (June 30, 2010) [hereinafter DS316 Panel 
Report]; Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 
WT/DS353/R (Mar. 31, 2011) [hereinafter DS353 Panel Report]. 
5 Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities and Certain Member States—
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/AB/R (May 18, 2011) 
[hereinafter DS316 AB Report]; Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Measures 
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), ¶1350(b)–(c), WT/DS353/AB/R 
(Mar. 12, 2012) [hereinafter DS353 AB Report]. 
6 Communication from the European Union, European Communities and Certain 
Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/17 (Dec. 1, 
2011); Communication from the United States, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in 
Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/15 (Sept. 23, 2012). 
7 Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, Constitution of the Panel, 
Note by the Secretariat, European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures 
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/24 (Apr. 25, 2012); Recourse to Article 
21.5 of the DSU by the European Union, Request for Consultations, United States—
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/16 (Sept. 
25, 2012). 
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dispute is still uncertain. 
Part II of this Comment examines the histories of the companies at 
issue and how competition within the large civil aircraft (LCA)
8
 industry 
brought about this dispute.  Part III introduces the international agreements 
relevant to the dispute, including the 1979 General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT),
9
 the bilateral 1992 Agreement on Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft between the United States and the EC,
10
 and the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement)
11
 and DSU that 
accompanied the creation of the WTO in the Uruguay Round in 1994.  Part 
IV traces the dispute through the WTO dispute settlement process.  Part V 
analyzes the future of the dispute, including difficulties in reaching a 
negotiated agreement, and the potential resolutions.  It suggests that while 
an agreement addressing only short-term concerns may be the easy and 
likely resolution, the parties should utilize the unique position that the WTO 
process, and its accompanying expense of significant time and resources, 
has afforded them to craft a comprehensive agreement suitable to 
addressing the future of the LCA industry. 
II.  THE COMPANIES 
A.  Boeing 
The Boeing Company (Boeing) was incorporated by William Edward 
Boeing on July 15, 1916, as Pacific Aero Products Company in Seattle, 




8 LCA are typically defined as aircraft with more than one hundred seats.  U.S. INT‘L 
TRADE COMM‘N, PUB. 3433, COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. LARGE CIVIL AIRCRAFT 
AEROSTRUCTURES INDUSTRY, INVESTIGATION NO. 332-414, at xix n.1 (2001), available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/PUB3433.PDF.  LCA currently in production include 
the Boeing 737 and Airbus A320 in the 100–200 seat range, the Boeing 767 and 787 and 
Airbus A330 in the 200–300 seat range, the Boeing 777 and Airbus A340 in the 300–400 
seat range, and the Boeing 747 and Airbus A380 at 400-plus seats.  BOEING COMMERCIAL 
AIRPLANES, BACKGROUNDER 1–3 (June 2011), http://www.boeing.com/commercial/ 
pdf/BCA_backgrounder.pdf; Passenger Aircraft, AIRBUS, http://www.airbus.com/ 
aircraftfamilies/passengeraircraft/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2012). 
9 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979 [hereinafter Subsidies Code], 
available at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/tokyo_scm_e.pdf. 
10 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
European Economic Community Concerning the Application of the GATT Agreement on 
Trade in Civil Aircraft on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (1992) [hereinafter LCA 
Agreement], available at http://trade.gov/static/aero_lgl_usaeeclca.pdf. 
11 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14, Annex 1A 
[hereinafter SCM Agreement]. 
12 History, The Beginnings: 1903–1926, BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/history/ 
narrative/n003boe.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2012). 
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Boeing‘s initial success in the aircraft industry was driven by its production 
of military aircraft, but it gained a foothold in the civil aviation industry in 
the 1950s with its development of the 707, a single-aisle, four engine 
aircraft, and the United States‘ first jet airliner.13  Boeing continued its 
growth in the 1960s when it introduced the 737, a short-to-medium-range 
single-aisle aircraft, which has sold over 6,000 aircraft and is the best 
selling commercial aircraft in history.
14
  The backbone of Boeing‘s civil 
aircraft line is the 747, which it introduced in 1969, and which was the 
largest and most expensive aircraft in the world until the introduction of the 
Airbus A380 in 2007.
15
  Since its introduction, the 747 has been the premier 
aircraft for long-haul international flights, and has been the world‘s most 
profitable commercial aircraft.
16
  Boeing has also produced families of 
aircraft serving a wide range of capacities and ranges between the 737 and 




Following its merger with McDonnell Douglas Corporation in 1997, 
Boeing became the last remaining major producer of commercial aircraft in 
the United States.
18
  Currently, Boeing controls nearly one hundred percent 
of the U.S. civil aviation manufacturing industry, and is the largest 
exporting manufacturer in the world.
19
  In addition to its civil aircraft 
division, Boeing is the second largest defense company in the world, 
 
13 Marc C.S. Mathis, Comment, Uncivil Aviation: How the Ongoing Trade Dispute 
Stalemate Between Boeing and Airbus Has Undermined GATT and May Continue to Usher 
In an Era of International Agreement Obsolescence Under the World Trade Organization, 
13 TULSA J. COMP. & INT‘L L. 177, 181–83 (2005); 707 Family, BOEING, 
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/707family/index.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).  First 
delivered on August 15, 1958, to Pan American World Airways, the 707 and Pan Am were 
the most successful airline-jetliner combinations of their era.  Michael Lombardi, Seventh 
Heaven, 50 Years Ago, Boeing and Pan Am Revolutionized Travel with the 707, BOEING 
FRONTIERS, July 2008, at 8, 8–9, available at http://www.boeing.com/news/frontiers 
/archive/2008/july/i_history.pdf. 
14 About the 737 Family, BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/commercial/737family/ 
background.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2012). 
15 Daniel I. Fischer, Comment, ―Super Jumbo‖ Problem: Boeing, Airbus, and the Battle 
for the Geopolitical Future, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 865, 877 (2002); Mathis, supra note 
13, at 183. 
16 Fischer, supra note 15, at 877. 
17 BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES, supra note 8, at 2–3; U.S. INT‘L TRADE COMM‘N, 
PUB. 3143, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE GLOBAL LARGE CIVIL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY 
AND MARKET IMPLICATIONS FOR THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. INDUSTRY, 
INVESTIGATION NO. 332-384, at 3-5 to 3-6 (1998) [hereinafter CHANGING STRUCTURE], 
available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub3143.pdf; Boeing 7-Series: Fast 
Facts: Boeing 757, BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/news/feature/sevenseries/757.html (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2012). 
18 Steven Pearlstein, Europeans Relent, Back Boeing Merger, WASH. POST (July 24, 
1997), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/longterm/boeing/boeing.htm. 
19 Fischer, supra note 15, at 866. 
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providing military aircraft and defense products and programs for the 
militaries of the United States and other nations, with the United States 
government being its largest customer.
20
 
After struggling during the downturn in the aviation industry following 
September 11, 2001, Boeing affirmed its commitment to developing and 
producing commercial aircraft when it announced the beginning of 
development of a new commercial aircraft in 2003.
21
  The 7E7, later named 
the 787 Dreamliner (787),
22
 is a mid-sized aircraft meant to replace the 767.  
It is also the first commercial aircraft to be built more than half with 
lightweight composite materials, which make up the majority of its tail, 
wing, and fuselage.
23
  A revolutionary development in aircraft design, the 
light weight of the composite materials allows the 787 to consume twenty 
percent less fuel than comparably sized aircraft, while also matching the 
speed and range of larger aircraft.
24
 
Japan‘s All Nippon Airways placed the initial order of 787s, ordering 
fifty on April 26, 2004, and Boeing secured orders and commitments for 
237 787s in the first year of sales.
25
  After several years of delays in design 
and production, Boeing delivered the first 787 on September 26, 2011.
26
  
Boeing has received over 800 orders for the 787, a record for a Boeing 
aircraft still under development, but its commercial success is not yet 
guaranteed.
27
  Some analysts predict that Boeing will need to sell over 
 
20 First Written Submission by the European Communities, United States—Measures 
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, ¶ 49, WT/DS353 (July 11, 2007) [hereinafter DS353 
EC First Written Submission], available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/ 
september/tradoc_136101.pdf. 
21 Sally B. Donnelly, Can This Plane Save Boeing?, TIME, Oct. 20, 2003, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1005919-1,00.html. 
22 See 787 Dreamliner: About the 787 Family, BOEING, http://boeing.com/commercial/ 
787family/background.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2012). 
23 Martha Walz, The Dream of Composites, R&D MAGAZINE, Nov. 20, 2006, available at 
http://www.rdmag.com/Featured-Articles/2006/11/The-Dream-of-Composites/; George 
Marsh, Boeing‘s 787: Trials, Tribulations, and Restoring the Dream, REINFORCED PLASTICS 
(Nov. 9, 2009), http://www.reinforcedplastics.com/view/9669/boeings-787-trials-tribulations 
-and-restoring-the-dream/. 
24 787 Dreamliner: About the 787 Family, supra note 22.  This efficiency is crucial to the 
design of the aircraft, as low operating costs have become increasingly important in airline‘s 
decisions to purchase aircraft.  CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 17, at 1-3 to 1-4. 
25 Lori Gunter, Great Expectations, BOEING FRONTIERS (June 2005), 
http://www.boeing.com/news/frontiers/archive/2005/june/cover.html; Marsh, supra note 23. 
26 Aubrey Cohen, Boeing Celebrates Delivery of First 787 Dreamliner, SEATTLEPI (Sept. 
26, 2011, 10:40 AM), http://blog.seattlepi.com/aerospace/2011/09/26/boeing-celebrates-
delivery-of-first-787-dreamliner/; David Kesmodel & Daniel Michaels, For Boeing, It‘s 
Been a Long, Strange Trip: After Three-Year Delay, Plane Maker Readies 787 Dreamliner 
Production; But Can It Crank Out 10 Per Month?, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904563904576585250595434650.html. 
27 Kesmodel & Michaels, supra note 26; Kyle Peterson, First Boeing 787 Delivered; 
Here Comes the Hard Part, REUTERS (Sept. 26, 2011, 6:06 AM), 
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1,000 aircraft before breaking even, and it will need to produce the aircraft 
at an unprecedented rate in order to get there and to avoid substantial costs 
for delays and cancellations.
28
 
B.  Airbus 
In response to American dominance in the commercial aircraft 
industry, a group of European nations organized in the late 1960s to create a 
European organization that could rival the American aircraft industry.
29
  In 
1970, Airbus Industrie GIE (Airbus GIE) was formed as a consortium 
between Aerospatiale of France and a group of Germany‘s leading 
manufacturing firms, which became Deutsche Aerospace.
30
  British 
Aerospace of the United Kingdom and Construcciones Aeronauticas SA of 
Spain (CASA) would also later join the consortium.
31
  In this form, Airbus 
GIE was ―a loose association of fully independently cost-centered 
companies.‖32  This organizational form underwent a transformation 
between 2001 and 2004 when the four independent partners became 
wholly-owned subsidiaries of Airbus SAS, which at that time was eighty 
percent owned by the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company 
(EADS).
33
  In 2006, EADS bought out the remaining twenty percent from 
BAE Systems of the United Kingdom.
34
  Today, Airbus SAS is 




Airbus has developed a full line of aircraft across the LCA market, 
 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/26/uk-boeing-analysis-idUSLNE78P01U20110926. 
28 Kesmodel & Michaels, supra note 26; see Peterson, supra note 27. 
29 CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 17, at 3-15; Mathis, supra note 13, at 185, 189. 
30 Mathis, supra note 13, at 183–84; Company Evolution: The Success Story of Airbus, 
AIRBUS, http://www.airbus.com/en/corporate/people/company_evolution (click Dec. 1970 
tab of the timeline, Creation of Airbus Industrie) (last visited Oct. 3, 2012). 
31 Ryan E. Lee, Comment, Dogfight: Criticizing the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures Amidst the Largest Dispute in World Trade Organization History, 
32 N.C. J. INT‘L L. & COM. REG. 115, 119 (2006).  This left the ownership of Airbus 
composed of 37.9% each by Aerospatiale and Deutsche Aerospace, 20% by British 
Aerospace, and 4.2% by CASA.  The Success Story of Airbus: Technology Leaders (1977–
1979), AIRBUS, http://www.airbus.com/company/history/the-narrative/technology-leaders-
1977-1979/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2012). 
32 First Written Submission by the European Communities, European Communities 
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, ¶ 69, WT/DS316 (Apr. 5, 2007) 
[hereinafter DS316 EC First Written Submission], available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ 
doclib/docs/2007/april/tradoc_134551.pdf. 
33 Id. at ¶ 68. 
34 First Written Submission of the United States, European Communities – Measures 
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, ¶43, WT/DS316 (Nov. 15, 2006) [hereinafter DS316 
US First Written Submission], available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/816. 
35 Mathis, supra note 13, at 190. 
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substantially competing with each of Boeing‘s aircraft.36  The A320 family, 
consisting of short-to-medium-range single aisle aircraft competing directly 
against the Boeing 737, entered service in 1988.
37
  In 1987, Airbus 
launched the development of the A330 and A340, wide-body jets 
competing in markets similar to the 767 and 777.
38
  The signatures of 
Airbus‘ aircraft are its fly-by-wire electronic flight control systems, 
introduced for the first time in commercial jetliners in the A320, and 
significant commonality within and across its aircraft families, reducing 
operations, training, and maintenance costs.
39
 
In overcoming the considerable barriers to entry in the LCA industry
40
 
and developing these aircraft, Airbus has depended on significant 
development financing provided by its member nations,
41
 termed ―member 
state financing‖ by the EC, and ―launch aid‖ by the United States.42  
Though the precise nature of those measures has been a significant point of 
contention, the financing is generally debt with payment of interest and 
principal based on a specified portion of the revenue of each aircraft sold, 
sometimes followed by additional royalty payments per aircraft, typically 
giving the lender less upside than equity, but less security than debt.
43
  
Airbus has received this financing from its member states for the 
development of each of its aircraft,
44
 though the nature and amount has been 
 
36 Id. at 189–90; see Lcmortensen, Airbus and Boeing: Passengers vs Range (Nov. 20, 
2009), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Airbus_and_Boeing_Passengers_vs_Range.png. 
37 CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 17, at 3-18; A320 Family, AIRBUS, 
http://www.airbus.com/aircraftfamilies/passengeraircraft/a320family/ (last visited Oct. 3, 
2012). 
38 The Timeline, AIRBUS, http://www.airbus.com/company/history/the-timeline/ (click 
June 1987: A330-300 launch, A340-200 launch, A340-300 launch) (last visited Oct. 3, 
2012). 
39 Commonality, AIRBUS, http://www.airbus.com/aircraftfamilies/passengeraircraft/ 
commonality/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2012). 
40 One unique aspect of the LCA industry is that developing and producing aircraft 
requires monumental up-front investments, with a long lead time before generating revenue.  
CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 17, at 2-1; DS316 EC First Written Submission, supra 
note 32, ¶ 27.  For example, in 1966, Boeing spent an estimated $1.2 billion—more than 
three times its total capitalization at that time—developing the 747.  CHANGING STRUCTURE, 
supra note 17, at 2-1 n.15.  The size of these investments essentially make the development 
of each new aircraft a bet-the-company investment.  Id. at 2-1.  This creates enormous 
barriers to entry in the LCA industry, and makes financing without government intervention 
exceedingly difficult except for established producers.  Id. at 2-1 to 2-3; see DS316 EC First 
Written Submission, supra note 32, ¶¶ 27–33. 
41 Mathis, supra note 13, at 189–90; CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 17, at 2-3. 
42 DS316 EC First Written Submission, supra note 32, ¶ 289–90. 
43 Id. ¶¶ 302–07, 319–23.  The United States characterizes launch aid as ―long-term 
unsecured loans at zero or below-market rates of interest, with back-loaded repayment 
schedules that allow Airbus to repay the loans through a levy on each delivery of the 
financed aircraft.‖  DS316 US First Written Submission, supra note 34, ¶ 4. 
44 DS316 EC First Written Submission, supra note 32, ¶¶ 328, 332, 338, 364–66. 





 and the subject of negotiated limitations.
46
 
Airbus has continuously gained market share in the LCA industry, 
going from fifteen percent in 1987,
47
 to twenty-nine percent in 1996,
48
 to 
over fifty percent of the global market in 1998—finally overtaking its 
American competitor.
49
  In 2003, Airbus delivered more new LCA than 
Boeing for the first time, making it the largest producer of LCA in the 
world,
50
 and it has maintained that title each year since.
51
 
In 1994, Airbus announced development of what would become its 
A380, a super-jumbo jet projected to seat over 600 passengers, in an effort 
to combat the monopoly Boeing enjoyed in jumbo jets with its 747.
52
  
Boeing and Airbus had initially engaged in discussions for joint 
development of the aircraft, but Boeing withdrew from the project when it 
decided that the market would not bear such a large aircraft.
53
  Airbus began 
production on the A380 in 2000 when it secured commitments for 50 
purchases of the new aircraft.
54
  On May 7, 2004, Airbus officially opened 
the final assembly line of the A380 in Toulouse, France,
55
 and the A380 
took its first test flight on April 27, 2005.
56
  As the largest aircraft in history 
and the first to have double decks along the entire length of the aircraft, the 
A380 made its first commercial flight on October 25, 2007, and to date, 




45 The United States alleges that Airbus has received highly preferential financing for the 
development of each of its families of aircraft.  DS316 US First Written Submission, supra 
note 34, ¶¶ 4, 49, 50, 52, 55, 70. 
46 See LCA Agreement, supra note 8, art. 4. 
47 DS316 US First Written Submission, supra note 34, ¶ 54. 
48 CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 17, at 3-19. 
49 Lee, supra note 31, at 120. 
50 DS316 US First Written Submission, supra note 34, ¶ 74. 
51 Tim Hepher, Airbus in the Lead, but Boeing Looks Set to Have a Great 2012, AL 
ARABIYA NEWS (Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/12/22/184007.html; 
David Pearson, Airbus Keeps Top Spot Over Boeing, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204468004577166423079873112.html?mo
d=rss_whats_news_us_business. 
52 See David Bowen, Airbus Will Reveal Plan for Super-Jumbo: Aircraft Would Seat at 
Least 600 People and Cost dollars 8bn to Develop, INDEPENDENT, June 4, 1994, available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/airbus-will-reveal-plan-for-superjumbo-
aircraft-would-seat-at-least-600-people-and-cost-dollars-8bn-to-develop-1420367.html. 
53 Fischer, supra note 15, at 877–78; CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 17, at 6-10, 6-12 
n.759. 
54 Airbus Jumbo on Runway: Boeing Seen Building Rival to Airbus A380 as 
Transatlanctic [sic] Scrap Intensifies, CNNMONEY (Dec. 19, 2000, 9:27 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2000/12/19/europe/airbus/. 
55 The ―Wow‖ Factor . . . and a New Era Dawns (2004–2007), AIRBUS, 
http://www.airbus.com/company/history/the-narrative/the-wow-factorand-a-new-era-dawns-
2004-2007/(last visited Oct. 10, 2012). 
56 Id. 
57 A380 Family, AIRBUS, http://www.airbus.com/aircraftfamilies/passengeraircraft/ 
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In addition, in 2004, Airbus announced development of the A350 
XWB, a long-range, mid-size, wide-body aircraft intended to compete 
directly against Boeing‘s 787 Dreamliner, also making use of lightweight 
composite materials for the airframe.
58
  The aircraft has faced a stream of 
delays, but is expected to begin final assembly in 2012 and enter service in 
2014,
59
 and has generated 567 orders from 35 customers.
60
 
III.  THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
Over the course of the competition between Airbus and Boeing, 
negotiations as to trade in the LCA industry and international trade in 
general have been ongoing, and have produced three primary agreements 
that affect the LCA industry and the Airbus–Boeing dispute.  First, the 
GATT Tokyo round in 1979 produced an agreement concerning trade in 
civil aircraft and a subsidies code.  Second, in 1992, the United States and 
the EC entered a bilateral agreement on trade in Large Civil Aircraft to 
supplement the GATT agreement.  Last, in 1994, the Uruguay round of the 
GATT created the WTO, which included the SCM Agreement and the 
DSU. 
A.  The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
The 1979 GATT Tokyo round of multilateral trade negotiations 
produced, among other agreements, a plurilateral Agreement on Trade in 
Civil Aircraft (ATCA).
61
  The preamble of the agreement noted that the 
Tokyo round sought to ―achieve the expansion and ever-greater 
liberalization of world trade through, inter alia, the progressive dismantling 
of obstacles to trade and the improvement of the international framework 
for the conduct of world trade.‖62  It also stated that the agreement was 
meant ―to eliminate adverse effects on trade in civil aircraft resulting from 
governmental support in civil aircraft development, production, and 
 
a380family/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2012); Michael Smith, Airbus A380 Lands in Sydney on 
First Commercial Flight, REUTERS (Oct. 25, 2007, 4:59 AM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2007/10/25/us-singapore-airlines-a-idUSSP20547320071025. 
58 Airbus to Launch Boeing 7E7 Rival, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi 
/business/4085631.stm (last updated Dec. 10, 2004); A340 XWB, AIRBUS, http://www. 
airbus.com/aircraftfamilies/passengeraircraft/a350xwbfamily/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2012). 
59 Airbus Owner EADS Reports Profits Fall and A350 Delays, BBC NEWS (Nov. 10, 
2011, 7:32 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15670426. 
60 Press Release, Airbus, Airbus in Illescas Delivers First A350 XWB Wing Lower Cover 
to Airbus in Broughton (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.airbus.com/presscentre/pressreleases/ 
press-release-detail/detail/airbus-in-illescas-delivers-first-a350-xwb-wing-lower-cover-to-
airbus-in-broughton/. 
61 Mathis, supra note 13, at 192; Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Apr. 12, 1979, 
GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) (1980) [hereinafter ATCA]. 
62 ATCA preamble. 
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marketing.‖63  Specifically, the agreement called for the elimination of all 
import duties on civil aircraft and components, and established a Committee 
on Trade in Civil Aircraft to meet as necessary to consult on matters 
relating to the agreement.
64
 
More importantly, concerning subsidies, the agreement also 
incorporated the portion of the 1979 GATT relating to subsidies.
65
  This 
agreement sought to ―reduce or eliminate the trade restricting or distorting 
effects‖66 of subsidies, yet also recognized that domestic ―subsidies are 
widely used as important instruments for the promotion of social and 
economic policy objectives.‖67  Therefore, the agreement prohibited export 
subsidies but permitted domestic subsidies, subject to assessment of 
countervailing duties.
68
  The agreement was also limited in its effectiveness 
because it did not define the term ―subsidy,‖ making it more of ―a general 
declaration of principles than a specific enforceable document.‖69 
The GATT also included an elementary dispute settlement procedure, 
in place since its inception in 1947.
70
  Under this procedure, a member 
could request the formation of a panel to hear a dispute, but any member, 
including the subject of the complaint, could delay or block the process by 
preventing the establishment of a panel and hindering the selection of 
panelists or the term of the panel.
71
  In addition, panel reports needed a 
consensus to be adopted, allowing even the losing party to prevent 
enforcement of the report.
72
 
B.  Bilateral Agreement on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft 
Because of the obvious deficiencies of the GATT in dealing with 
subsidies in the civil aircraft industry, and in light of Airbus‘ increasing 
success against Boeing and American manufacturers, the United States 
soon felt pressure to reach a new agreement limiting subsidies.
73
  In 1984, 
the United States began discussions to revise the GATT‘s ATCA, hoping to 
eliminate subsidies to Airbus.
74
  The United States also began bilateral 
 
63 Id. 
64 Id. arts. 2, 8. 
65 Id. art 6. 
66 Subsidies Code preamble, art. 11(1). 
67 Id. 
68 Mathis, supra note 13, at 193. 
69 Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 1, at 198. 
70 Fischer, supra note 15, at 879–80. 
71 Lee, supra note 31, at 135. 
72 Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 1, at 204. 
73 Fischer, supra note 15, at 874; Mathis, supra note 13, at 195; Meier-Kaienburg, supra 
note 1, at 198. 
74 Jennifer A. Manner, How to Avoid Airbus II: A Primer for Domestic Industry, 23 CAL. 
W. INT‘L L.J. 139, 144 (1992); Lee, supra note 31, at 123–23. 
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negotiations in 1987 with the EC regarding Airbus‘ funding.75  These 
discussions stalemated over the percentage of development costs that could 
be subsidized, until the United States learned of an explicit export subsidy 
provided to Deutsche Airbus in the form of exchange rate guarantees worth 
an estimated $2.5 million on each aircraft delivered in 1990.
76
  The United 
States brought a GATT action against the EC.  A GATT disputes panel 
found in favor of the United States in January 1992, although the EC 
blocked adoption of the ruling in the GATT council, precluding the 
implementation of remedial measures by the United States.
77
 
While this first complaint addressed only the particular export subsidy 
to Deutsche Airbus, the United States also filed a second complaint in May 
1991 broadly covering subsidies given to each of the Airbus entities by the 
member governments since its inception, totaling $13.5 billion.
78
  Having 
already blocked one panel report and facing this much more far-reaching 
complaint, the EC finally relented and agreed to certain limits on subsidies 
to Airbus in a bilateral agreement with the United States.
79
  Rather than 
establishing a comprehensive scheme addressing subsidies in large civil 
aircraft, though, this agreement was merely a concession by the EC to keep 




Still, the bilateral Agreement on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, signed 
in July 1992, made some important strides to establishing limits on 
subsidies.
81
  First, the agreement addressed direct subsidies by banning all 
future production subsidies
82
 and limiting development subsidies at thirty-
 
75 Lee, supra note 31, at 124. 
76 Manner, supra note 74, at 145; Shane Spradlin, Comment, The Aircraft Subsidies 
Dispute in the GATT‘s Uruguay Round, 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 1191, 1207 (1995). 
77 Spradlin, supra note 76, at 1208–09; Manner, supra note 74, at 148–49. 
78 Manner, supra note 74, at 150. 
79 Richard O. Cunningham, Subsidies to Large Civil Aircraft Production: New WTO 
Subsidy Rules and Dispute Settlement Mechanism Alter Dynamics of U.S.-E.U. Dispute, AIR 
& SPACE LAW, Fall 1999, at 4–5; Spradlin, supra note 76, at 1208. 
80 Cunningham, supra note 79, at 5; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE: LONG-TERM VIABILITY OF US—EUROPEAN UNION AIRCRAFT AGREEMENT 
UNCERTAIN 3 (1994) [hereinafter LONG-TERM VIABILITY], available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
archive/1995/gg95045.pdf.  U.S. representatives saw foregoing a GATT complaint on 
subsidies to Airbus as the primary consideration they gave to the EU under the treaty, since 
they did not believe that current or future levels of indirect aid would reach the limits set in 
the agreement.  Id. at 15–16, 23–24, 34.  The EU placed more value on the limitation of 
indirect aid, however, and viewed the treaty as a trade-off between their direct aid and the 
United States‘ indirect aid.  Id. at 15–16. 
81 Michael J. Levick, Comment, The Production of Civil Aircraft: A Compromise of Two 
World Giants, 21 TRANSP. L.J. 433, 452 (1993). 
82 LCA Agreement, supra note 8, art. 3.  Production includes ―all manufacturing, 
marketing and sales activities‖ other than development costs.  LCA Agreement Annex II, ¶ 
4.  The Agreement did grandfather in existing production subsidies, however.  Id. art. 3. 
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three percent of a new plane‘s total development costs.83  These 
development subsidies were allowed only in the form of loans, where they 
could be expected to be repaid within seventeen years.
84
  They were 
additionally required to be repaid in that timeframe at an interest rate no 
less than the cost of borrowing to the government.
85
 
In regard to indirect subsidies, the Agreement capped permissible 
levels of benefit received indirectly through government contracts at three 
percent of the industry-wide turnover and four percent of the turnover for 
each individual manufacturer.
86
  Indirect benefits were defined as any 
―identifiable reduction in costs of large civil aircraft resulting from 
government-funded research and development in the aeronautical area.‖87 
The Agreement also sought transparency by requiring the regular 
exchange of information relating to subsidies.
88
  Along those same lines, the 
agreement called for the parties to meet at least twice a year ―to ensure the 
correct functioning of the Agreement‖89 and allowed either party to request 
consultations relating to the functioning of the agreement.
90
  However, the 
agreement provided no remedy for breach, so the only recourse for non-
compliance was abrogation of the agreement.
91
  In addition, while the 
 
83 Id. art. 4; Levick, supra note 81, at 452.  Development costs include design, testing, 
equipment development, flight testing, and prototype manufacturing costs.  LCA Agreement 
Annex II, ¶ 3. 
84 LCA Agreement, supra note 8, art. 4. 
85 Id. 
86 Levick, supra note 81, at 452. 
87 LCA Agreement, supra note 8, art 5.3.  The Agreement also expanded on this 
definition in Annex II, which defines ―indirect government support‖ as ―[F]inancial support 
provided by a government . . . for aeronautical applications, including research and 
development, demonstration projects and development of military aircraft, which provide an 
identifiable benefit to the development or production of one or more specific large civil 
aircraft programmes.‖  Id. Annex II, ¶ 5. 
88 Id. art. 8. 
89 Id. art. 11. 
90 Id. art. 11. 
91 Id. art. 10.  This immediately called into question the viability of the agreement, 
though the parties saw the benefits of the agreement, namely, ―constraints on direct support 
provided to Airbus, in the case of the United States, and a reduction in the threat of trade 
action in the case of the EC,‖ as reasonable incentives for compliance.  LONG-TERM 
VIABILITY, supra note 80, at 3.  Disagreements over interpretation of the agreement began 
nearly immediately following the agreement, however, particularly as to the definitions of 
production subsidies and indirect subsidies.  Id. at 19–21, 23–28.  As to indirect subsidies, 
the EC calculated indirect benefits by totaling the total amount of government appropriations 
for aeronautics research and development, without regard for what benefits, if any, flowed to 
LCA, while the U.S. methodology was to ask LCA manufacturers to self-identify what 
benefits they received for specific existing LCA through government-sponsored research and 
development.  Id. at 23–27.  Using these methods, the EC calculated indirect subsidies by the 
United States at between 4.4% and 5.8% in 1992, in excess of the agreed limits, id. at 25, 
while the United States calculated that zero indirect benefits were realized during that time.  
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parties agreed not to initiate trade actions with respect to subsidies in 
conformity with the Agreement so long as it is in force,
92
 they retained their 
rights and obligations under the GATT 1947 and any successor 
agreements,
93
 so when the United States later abrogated the agreement, the 




C.  Uruguay Round Agreements 
Following the bilateral agreement, the parties continued discussions to 
try to create a new agreement addressing large civil aircraft under the 
GATT as part of the Uruguay Round.
95
  However, disagreements began 
immediately, as the United States wanted to set the 1992 agreement as a 
baseline and build on its commitments, while the EC preferred to eliminate 
the 1992 agreement, or alternatively, to exempt civil aircraft from the 
Subsidies Code.
96
  The parties grew even further apart during 1993 as each 
attempted to strengthen their respective subsidy programs.
97
  As the 
deadline approached without progress on the civil aircraft agreement, 
neither party was willing to let this one industry derail the GATT 
agreements that covered trillions of dollars in annual world trade.
98
  A 
compromise eventually won out under which the 1992 agreement would 
remain in force and the civil aircraft industry would remain subject to the 
GATT Subsidies Code.
99
  The parties also agreed to a one-year standstill 




Consequently, when the GATT Uruguay round was signed on 
 
Id. at 26. 
92 LCA Agreement, supra note 8, art. 10.2. 
93 Id. preamble. 
94 DS316 Panel Report, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 7.89, 7.98, 7.100.  This interpretation was not 
without dispute, though.  See id. 
95 Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 1, at 201; LONG-TERM VIABILITY, supra note 80, at 42. 
96 Spradlin, supra note 76, at 1210. 
97 Id. at 1210–11.  The U.S. LCA industry sought additional indirect governmental aid, 
such as increased funding for the U.S. Export–Import Bank, while France unveiled 
additional funding for industrial production.  Id.; Civil Aircraft Needs Continued Coverage 
Under Subsidies Code, U.S. Industry Says, 9 INT‘L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 10, at 1386 (Aug. 
12, 1992); French Trade Official Says Airbus‘ Fears in GATT Talks Are Unjustified, 10 
INT‘L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 10, at 1687 (Oct. 6, 1993). 
98 Spradlin, supra note 76, at 1212; Gow, supra note 3. 
99 Spradlin, supra note 76, at 1213–14; LONG-TERM VIABILITY, supra note 80, at 42.  
Though LCA as a whole were included under the SCM Agreement, two footnotes were 
added exempting LCA from certain avenues to establishing ―serious prejudice,‖ as a 
concession to the EU, and research and development for LCA were also excepted from the 
protected category of Non-Actionable Subsidies.  SCM Agreement art. 6.1 n.15, n.16, art. 
8.2 n.24; LONG-TERM VIABILITY, supra note 80, at 45–47. 
100 Spradlin, supra note 76, at 1213–1214. 
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December 15, 1994, it did not include a new agreement on civil aircraft.
101
  
However, the Uruguay round produced the SCM Agreement and the DSU, 
each of which affects the LCA industry. 
1.  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
The SCM Agreement made an important improvement on the GATT 
by defining ―subsidies.‖102  Under the SCM Agreement, a subsidy exists 
where ―there is a financial contribution by a government‖ and ―a benefit is 
thereby conferred.‖103  Financial contribution is broadly construed as 
meaning ―money or anything else of value provided to a manufacturer or 
exporter at a cost less than would have been charged in a commercial 
transaction.‖104  This includes measures such as exchange rate guarantees, 
debt forgiveness, export credits, and equity infusions, and any capital or 
development supports provided on terms more favorable than terms 
available from commercial lenders.
105
  In addition, this can also include 
indirect support such as benefits from government or defense contracts.
106
 
The SCM Agreement splits subsidies into three classifications, referred 
to as the ―traffic light approach.‖107  Under this approach, one class of 
subsidies is permissible (―green light‖), a second class is actionable only 
upon showing of adverse effects on free trade (―yellow light‖), while the 
third class is prohibited almost entirely (―red light‖).108 
Export subsidies, defined as ―subsidies contingent, in law or in 
fact, . . . upon export performance,‖109 or ―upon the use of domestic over 
imported goods,‖110 fall under the class of Prohibited Subsidies (―red 
light‖).111  The SCM Agreement provides an illustrative list of export 
subsidies that includes the ―provision by governments of direct subsidies to 
a firm or an industry contingent upon export performance‖ in addition to 
other items such as exchange rate guarantees or other measures that give 
preference to exports over domestic products.
112
  These prohibited subsidies 
are actionable without a showing of adverse effects, and the dispute 




101 Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 1, at 199; LONG-TERM VIABILITY, supra note 80, at 42. 
102 Mathis, supra note 13, at 200. 
103 SCM Agreement art. 1.1. 
104 Cunningham, supra note 79, at 6. 
105 Id. 
106 Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 1, at 202–03. 
107 Id. at 203. 
108 Id. 
109 SCM Agreement art. 3.1. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. Annex I. 
113 Id. arts. 3, 4. 
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To fall under the category of Actionable Subsidies (―yellow light‖), the 
subsidy must be a specific subsidy
114
 and cause adverse effects to the 
interests of another member, including ―(a) injury to the domestic industry 
of another Member; (b) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing 
directly or indirectly to other Members . . . ; [or] (c) serious prejudice to the 
interests of another Member.‖115  A specific subsidy is any subsidy where 
―the granting authority . . . explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain 
enterprises,‖ or where the subsidy has that effect in fact.116  Serious 
prejudice is found when the subsidy displaces or impedes imports into the 
subsidizing country or a third country market, when the subsidy causes 
significant price undercutting, suppression, depression, or lost sales, or 




2.  Dispute Settlement Understanding 
The Uruguay round also produced the DSU, which was an important 
improvement on the dispute resolution process under GATT.  Unlike the 
GATT process, under which a single party could block the adoption of a 
panel report, the DSU requires a consensus to reject a panel report, making 
the presumption in favor of adjudication.
118
  Like the GATT process, 
though, the DSU is primarily aimed at conciliation and is targeted more 
towards facilitating the process than creating a resolution.
119
 
The dispute resolution process begins under the DSU when a Member 
State files a Request for Consultations.
120
  The request must identify the 
measures at issue and the legal basis for the complaint.
121
  During this 
consultation stage, the parties are to meet and attempt to resolve the dispute 
on their own.
122
  This stage is meant to take no more than sixty days.
123
 
If the parties fail to reach an agreement, the complaining party can 
then request that the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) establish a panel to 
adjudicate the dispute.
124
  The defendant party can block the formation of a 
panel once, but the DSB will establish a panel upon request at its second 
 
114 Id. art. 1.2. 
115 Id. art. 5. 
116 Id. art. 2.1. 
117 Id. art. 6.3. 
118 Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 1, at 204. 
119 Mathis, supra note 13, at 199. 
120 Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes: A Unique Contribution, WORLD TRADE 
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 
2012) [hereinafter Settling Disputes]; Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 1, at 211; see DSU art. 4. 
121 DSU art. 4.4. 
122 Id. art 4; Lee, supra note 31, at 136–37; Settling Disputes, supra note 120. 
123 DSU art. 4.7; Settling Disputes, supra note 120. 
124 DSU art. 4.7; Lee, supra note 31, at 136–37; Settling Disputes, supra note 120. 
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meeting barring a consensus against appointing the panel.
125
  Because there 
are no permanent panels, a new panel is created for each dispute.
126
  The 
parties to the dispute may decide on the members of the panel, but if they 
cannot agree they can request that the Director-General choose the 
panelists.
127
  A panel is supposed to be formed within forty-five days of the 
request, and the panel is supposed to complete its work and issue its report 
within six months.
128
  This means that the time from a request for 




A party may appeal a panel report to the Appellate Body (AB).
130
  A 
three-member panel chosen for each case from the seven-member AB, a 
permanent body, hears the appeals.
131
  However, factual determinations by 
the original panel are not subject to appeal, as only issues of law and legal 
interpretations may be raised on appeal.
132
  Within thirty days of a decision 
by the appellate panel, or within sixty days of a panel decision if there is no 
appeal, the DSB will adopt the report unless a consensus rejects it.
133
 
Upon a finding of a violation, the panel or the AB will recommend that 
the infringing nation bring its measures into conformity with the applicable 
obligations, and may, but is not required to, make suggestions as to how to 
implement the recommendations.
134
  Following the adoption of a panel or 
AB report, the DSU expects ―prompt compliance‖ with the panel‘s 
recommendations and rulings.
135
  Absent a separately negotiated resolution, 
―the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure 
the withdrawal of the measures concerned.‖136  Within thirty days of the 
adoption of a report, the offending party is to ―inform the DSB of its 
intentions in respect of implementation of the recommendations and ruling 








125 DSU art. 6.1; Settling Disputes, supra note 120. 
126 Lee, supra note 31, at 137–38; see DSU art. 8. 
127 DSU art. 8.7; Lee, supra note 31, at 136–37; Settling Disputes, supra note 120. 
128 DSU art. 12.8; Settling Disputes, supra note 120. 
129 DSU art. 20; Settling Disputes, supra note 120. 
130 DSU art. 17.4; Settling Disputes, supra note 120. 
131 DSU art. 17.1; Settling Disputes, supra note 120. 
132 DSU art. 17.6; Settling Disputes, supra note 120; Lee, supra note 31, at 139–40. 
133 DSU arts. 16.4, 17.14; Settling Disputes, supra note 120. 
134 DSU art. 19.1. 
135 Id. art. 21.1; Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 1, at 225; Settling Disputes, supra note 
120. 
136 DSU art. 3.7. 
137 Id. art. 21.3. 
138 Id. 
139 If there is a dispute as to whether a party has fully complied with the 
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DSU allows for compensation and retaliation,
140
 but these measures are 
meant solely to bring the offending party into compliance with its 
obligations and do not provide retrospective relief.
141
  If the party is not 
compliant within a reasonable period of time, it can enter negotiations to 
―develop[] mutually acceptable compensation.‖142  Compensation in this 
context means a trade benefit granted by the losing party to the prevailing 
party to prospectively counter the nullification or impairment caused by the 
nonconforming measure.
143
  However, because this only comes up in the 




If no agreement is reached, the prevailing party ―may request 
authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member 
concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered 
agreements.‖145  The DSB will accept the request to suspend concessions 
absent a consensus against it.
146
  The level of the suspension of concessions 
is to be ―equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment,‖ meaning 
prospective rather than past nullification or impairment, and may only be 
held in place until the offending party becomes compliant.
147
  The 
suspended concessions should be as closely linked to the sector subject to 
the complaint as possible, but can apply to obligations in other sectors 
under the same agreement, or under other agreements if necessary.
148
  Such 
measures can be effective in exerting pressure on noncompliant parties, but 
also adversely affect the retaliating party by making the imports subject to 
retaliation more expensive to its own consumers.
149
  These measures can 
also burden industries that are not directly involved in the particular dispute 
and that derived no benefit from the subsidies.
150
 
D.  Negotiations Following the Uruguay Round 
Following the Uruguay Round, the United States felt increased 
 
recommendations, the parties can refer the matter to the original panel for a determination.  
DSU art. 21.5. 
140 DSU arts. 3.7, 22; Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek, Financial 
Compensation in the WTO, 8 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 101, 102 (2005). 
141 Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 140, at 102–03; see DSU arts. 3.7, 22. 
142 DSU 22.2. 
143 Carlos M. Vazquez & John H. Jackson, Some Reflections on Compliance with WTO 
Dispute Settlement Decisions, 33 LAW & POL‘Y INT‘L BUS. 555, 560 (2002). 
144 Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 140, at 103. 
145 DSU art. 22.2. 
146 Id. art. 22.6. 
147 Id. arts. 22.4, 22.8; Vazquez & Jackson, supra note 143, at 560. 
148 DSU art. 22.3. 
149 Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 140, at 102–04. 
150 Id. 
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pressure to limit LCA subsidies as Airbus continued to have success against 
Boeing and steadily gained market share.
151
  In 2003, Airbus delivered more 
new aircraft than Boeing for the first time.
152
  In addition, Airbus had two 
aircraft in development: the A380, which would compete directly against 
the 747, Boeing‘s flagship aircraft, and the A350 XWB, which would 
compete directly against the 787, Boeing‘s revolutionary new midsize 
aircraft.
153
  These threats to two of Boeing‘s most important assets, along 
with Airbus‘ generally increasing market share, heightened concerns about 
subsidies and set the stage for a confrontation.
154
  The parties engaged in 
negotiations in the fall of 2004 in order to modify the 1992 Bilateral 
Agreement, but were unable to make headway.
155
 
IV.  THE DISPUTE IN THE WTO 
A.  The Complaints 
With these negotiations at a standstill, the United States chose to 
abrogate the Bilateral Agreement on October 6, 2004, citing violations by 
the EC.
156
  That same day, it initiated the WTO DSU process by requesting 
consultations with the EC.
157
  The EC responded by filing its own request 
for consultations, alleging that the United States violated the SCM 




The Request for Consultations by the United States focused primarily 
on launch aid, defined as the provision of financing for the design and 
 
151 Robert J. Carbaugh & John Olienyk, Boeing-Airbus Subsidy Dispute: A Sequel, 4 
GLOBAL ECON. J. Issue 2, Article 6, at 3 (2004), available at http://www.relooney. 
info/0_New_10.pdf. 
152 Id. 
153 Fischer, supra note 15, at 878–79; Airbus to Launch Boeing 7E7 Rival, supra note 58; 
see supra Part II.B. 
154 Boeing v Airbus: See You In Court, ECONOMIST, (Mar. 23, 2005) [hereinafter Boeing 
v. Airbus], http://www.economist.com/node/3793314; Nina Pavcnik, Trade Disputes in the 
Commercial Aircraft Industry, 25 WORLD ECON. 733, 733 (2002); see Fischer, supra note 15, 
at 878–79. 
155 Carbaugh & Olienyk, supra note 151, at 3; Boeing v Airbus, supra note 154. 
156 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Files WTO Case Against 
EU Over Unfair Airbus Subsidies (Oct. 6, 2004), available at http://ustraderep.gov/ 
Document_Library/Press_Releases/2004/October/US_Files_WTO_Case_Against_EU_Over
_Unfair_Airbus_Subsidies.html.  The EC does not recognize the validity of the United 
States‘ withdrawal from the Bilateral LCA Agreement, maintaining that it did not violate the 
agreement, so the United States had no right to renounce it.  DS316 EC First Written 
Submission, supra note 32, ¶¶ 124–30. 
157 DS316 Request for Consultations, supra note 1, at 1. 
158 DS317 Request for Consultations, supra note 2, at 1. 
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development of aircraft to the Airbus companies by the Member States.
159
  
The complaint alleged that these loans were provided at no-interest or 
below-market interest rates, and with repayment contingent on the success 
of the aircraft being funded, making projects possible that would not 
otherwise be commercially feasible.
160
  The United States alleged that this 
financing accounted for one hundred percent of the development costs of 
the A300 family, up to ninety percent for the A320, sixty to ninety percent 




In addition, the Request for Consultations alleged that Airbus received 
government grants and government-provided goods and services to 
develop, expand, and upgrade Airbus manufacturing sites for the 
development and production of the A380.
162
  It also alleged Airbus received 
grants and financing on preferential terms for research and development, 
both directly and through the European Investment Bank (EIB).
163
  Finally, 
the complaint alleged that Airbus benefitted from the assumption and 




The alleged subsidies applied to the entire line of Airbus aircraft.
165
  
The United States calculated the value of these subsidies for the A380 alone 
at approximately $6.5 billion.
166
  These included approximately $4 billion 
in launch aid, a €700 million ($900 million) subsidized loan from the EIB, 
in addition to €751 million ($966 million) from Hamburg, €200 million 
($257 million) from Toulouse, and ₤19.5 million ($31.2 million) from the 
Welsh Assembly for various industrial facilities for the A380, plus 
hundreds of millions of Euros in grants for research and development.
167
 
The Request for Consultations by the EC, meanwhile, focused on state 
and local tax subsidies and indirect subsidies to Boeing through various 
government contracts.
168
  Specifically, the EC alleged that Boeing received 
 
159 DS316 Request for Consultations, supra note 1, at 1.  The EC refers to these types of 
measures as Member State financing.  See DS316 EC First Written Submission, supra note 
32, ¶ 290. 
160 DS316 Request for Consultations, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
161 DS316 US First Written Submission, supra note 34, ¶¶ 49, 52, 55, 70. 




166 DS316 US First Written Submission, supra note 34, ¶ 7; Press Release, Office of the 
U. S. Trade Representative, U.S. Files WTO Case Against EU Over Unfair Airbus Subsidies 
(Oct. 6, 2004), available at http://ustraderep.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/ 
2004/October/US_Files_WTO_Case_Against_EU_Over_Unfair_Airbus_Subsidies.html. 
167 DS316 US First Written Submission, supra note 34, ¶ 7. 
168 DS317 Request for Consultations, supra note 2; DS353 EC First Written Submission, 
supra note 20, ¶ 23. 
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just under $5 billion in benefits from the states of Washington and Kansas 
relating to the 787 Dreamliner and $25 million from the State of Illinois and 
City of Chicago for the relocation of its headquarters.
169
  In addition, the 
complaint alleged Boeing received over $16 billion in indirect subsidies in 
the form of research and development and procurement contracts with the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of 
Defense, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology, an agency 
of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
170
  These contracts amounted to 
subsidies to LCA, as alleged by the EC, by foregoing or waiving patent 
rights and granting exclusive or early access to data, trade secrets, and other 
knowledge resulting from the government-funded research.
171
  Finally, the 
complaint alleged that Boeing benefitted in the amount of over $2 billion 
from special tax treatment for ―Foreign Sales Corporations‖ under the 
Internal Revenue Code.
172
  These alleged subsidies totaled $23.7 billion.
173
 
B.  The Procedure 
The parties held the consultations as to these complaints as required 
under the DSU on November 4 and 5, 2004.
174
  These consultations did not 
bring about a resolution, but just prior to moving forward with the DSU 
process, on January 11, 2005, the parties were able to agree to a framework 
for additional negotiations.
175
  The agreement set as its objective ―to secure 
a comprehensive agreement to end subsidies to large civil aircraft 
producers.‖176  The parties agreed to both a subsidies standstill and a 
 
169 DS317 Request for Consultations, supra note 2, at 1; DS353 EC First Written 
Submission, supra note 20, ¶ 23. 
170 DS317 Request for Consultations, supra note 2, at 1–2; DS353 EC First Written 
Submission, supra note 20, ¶ 23. 
171 DS317 Request for Consultations, supra note 2, at 1–3.  For example, the EC alleged 
that Boeing‘s extensive use of composite materials in the 787 was made possible by decades 
of research funded by the U.S. government for the express purpose of increasing the 
competitiveness of the U.S. aeronautics industry.  DS353 EC First Written Submission, 
supra note 20, ¶ 13. 
172 DS317 Request for Consultations, supra note 2, at 2–3; DS353 EC First Written 
Submission, supra note 20, ¶ 23. 
173 DS353 EC First Written Submission, supra note 20, ¶ 2. 
174 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, European Communities 
and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 1, 
WT/DS316/2 (May 31, 2005); Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European 
Communities, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 1, 
WT/DS317/2 (May 31, 2005). 
175 Press Release, Office of the U. S. Trade Representative, United States Takes Next 
Step in Airbus WTO Litigation (May 30, 2005), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/archive/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2005/May/United_States_T
akes_Next_Step_in_Airbus_WTO_Litigation.html [hereinafter United States Takes Next 
Step]. 
176 EU/US Agreement on Terms for Negotiation to End Subsidies for Large Civil 
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litigation standstill, and set three months for negotiations.
177
  However, the 
EC backed away from the goal of ending subsidies and instead considered 
granting billions in new launch aid subsidies for the development of the 
A350.
178
  Both parties therefore moved forward in the DSU process, 
requesting the establishment of panels and the commencement of Annex V 
procedures
179
 on May 31, 2005.
180
 
Several procedural complications arose at this point, further 
complicating the process and separating the timing of the two separate 
proceedings.  The DSB considered each of the requests for the 
establishment of a panel at its meeting on June 13, 2005, at which both the 
United States and the EC objected to the establishment of the panels, as was 
their right under the DSU.
181
  The United States further objected at that 
meeting that the Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the EC 
improperly exceeded the scope of its Request for Consultations and that the 




At its meeting on July 20, 2005, the DSB established separate panels 
for the two proceedings, designated as DS316 for the complaint by the 
United States and DS317 for the complaint by the EC.
183
  The parties were 
unable to agree on the members of the panels as to either dispute, so they 
 
Aircraft, Jan. 11, 2005, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/january/ 
tradoc_120976.pdf. 
177 Press Release, European Comm‘n, EU/US Agreement on Terms for Negotiation to 
End Subsidies For Large Civil Aircraft (Jan. 11, 2005), available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/january/tradoc_120978.pdf; Press Release, Office 
of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement of U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick 
Regarding U.S.– EU Agreement on Terms for Negotiation to End Subsidies for Large Civil 
Aircraft (Jan. 11, 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/archive/Document_Library/Press_ 
Releases/2005/January/January_11,_2005_Statement_of_US_Trade_Representative_Robert
_B_Zoellick_Regarding_US-EU_Agreement_on_Terms_for_Negotiation.html. 
178 United States Takes Next Step, supra note 175; Opening Statement of the United 
States, First Meeting of the Panel, European Communities and Certain Member States—
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, ¶ 10, WT/DS316 (Mar. 20, 2007), 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/826. 
179 Annex V of the SCM Agreement, titled Procedures for Developing Information 
Concerning Serious Prejudice, is the equivalent of the discovery process for the WTO.  See 
SCM Agreement Annex V. 
180 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, supra note 174; 
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, supra note 174. 
181 DS316 US First Written Submission, supra note 34, ¶ 11. 
182 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Addendum, United States—
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS317/1/Add.1 (June 27, 2005). 
183 Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the European Communities, 
Note by the Secretariat, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 
WT/DS317/4 (Oct. 25, 2005); Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the 
United States, Note by the Secretariat, European Communities and Certain Member States—
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/4 (Oct. 25, 2005). 
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each requested that the Director-General determine the composition of the 
panels, which he did for both panels on October 17, 2005.
184
 
The EC officially requested consultations on the additional issues that 
the United States had objected to as outside the scope of the previous 
consultations,
185
 and those consultations were held on August 3, 2005, but 
again failed to resolve the matter.
186
  The United States persisted in its 
objection to the scope of the panel proceeding and refused to comply with 
the Annex V procedures as to the items it considered outside the scope of 
the Request for Consultations or improperly identified in the original panel 
request.
187
  The EC requested that the DS317 Panel rule authoritatively on 
the Panel‘s scope, but the Panel declined to do so.188  Because of this, the 
EC subsequently requested that the DSB establish an additional panel as to 
its new request for consultations.
189
  On February 17, 2006, the DSB 
established a panel regarding this new request, now designated as DS353, 
and on November 22, 2006, the Deputy Director-General constituted the 
panel at the request of the EC.
190
  With this new panel established, the EC 
did not continue to pursue the DS317 complaint.
191
 
The DS353 Panel held its meetings in September 2007 and January 
2008.
192
  The Panel notified the parties on four occasions that, ―in light of 
the substantive and procedural complexities of this dispute,‖ it would not be 
able to complete its work within the six month timeframe called for by the 
DSU,
193




184 Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the European Communities, 
Note by the Secretariat, supra note 183; Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request 
of the United States, Note by the Secretariat, supra note 183. 
185 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Addendum, United States—
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS317/1/Add.1 (June 27, 2005). 
186 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, United 
States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 1, WT/DS317/5 (Jan. 20, 2006). 
187 DS353 EC First Written Submission, supra note 20, ¶ 52. 
188 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, supra note 
186. 
189 Id. at 2. 
190 Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the European Communities, 
Note by the Secretariat, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 
WT/DS353/3 (Dec. 4, 2006). 
191 DS353 EC First Written Submission, supra note 20, ¶ 53; Communication from the 
Chairman of the Panel, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 
WT/DS317/6 (Apr. 13, 2006). 
192 WT/DS353—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), 
EUR. COMMISSION, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/wtodispute/show.cfm?id=354&code=1#_eu-
submissions (last updated Oct. 19, 2011). 
193 Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, United States—Measures Affecting 
Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/4 (May 18, 2007); 
Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, United States—Measures Affecting Trade 
in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/5 (July 11, 2008); Communication 
from the Chairman of the Panel, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
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Both parties filed appeals,
195
 and after holding hearings in August and 
October 2011, the AB issued its report on March 12, 2012.
196
  The DSU 
adopted the recommendations and rulings on March 26, 2012, bringing the 
substantive portion of the DS353 dispute to a close.
197
 
Meanwhile, the complaint by the United States against the EC and 
Airbus has proceeded somewhat quicker, notwithstanding some procedural 
complications of its own.  Following the establishment of a panel in DS316, 
the EC raised objections to the Annex V process based on the scope of the 
panel request, similar to the United States‘ objections in DS317.198  In 
response to the EC‘s request for a preliminary ruling on this objection, the 
United States filed an additional request for consultations on January 31, 
2006,
199
 and subsequently requested a panel for that request.
200
  The United 
States requested that the same panel address the matters raised in this 
additional request,
201
 but the Deputy Director-General did not name the 
existing DS316 panelists to the new Panel, designated as DS347.
202
  
Because this separate panel proceeding would be duplicative, the United 
 
Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/6 (Dec. 16, 2009); Communication from the 
Chairman of the Panel, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft 
(Second Complaint), WT/DS353/7 (July 7, 2010). 
194 DS353 Panel Report, supra note 4. 
195 Notification of an Appeal by the European Union under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of 
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) 
and under Rule 20(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, United States—
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/8 (Apr. 1, 
2011); Notification of an Other Appeal by the United States under Article 16.4 and Article 
17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(DSU) and under Rule 23(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, United 
States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), 
WT/DS353/10 (Apr. 28, 2011). 
196 Communication from the Appellate Body, United States—Measures Affecting Trade 
in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/11 (July 6, 2011); DS353 AB 
Report, supra note 5. 
197 Appellate Body Report and Panel Report, Action by the Dispute Settlement Body, 
United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), 
WT/DS353/13 (Mar. 26, 2012). 
198 DS316 EC First Written Submission, supra note 32, ¶ 15. 
199 Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities and Certain 
Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/1/Add.1 (Jan 
31, 2006). 
200 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, European Communities 
and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 
WT/DS316/6 (Apr. 10, 2006). 
201 Request by the United States for a Decision of the Dispute Settlement Body, 
European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large 
Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/5 (Apr. 10, 2006). 
202 See Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the United States, Note by 
the Secretariat, European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting 
Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS347/5 (July 24, 2006). 
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States asked on October 6, 2006, that the panel suspend its work,
203
 and 
later allowed the DS347 panel to lapse
204
 after the DS316 panel found in 
favor of the United States in regard to the EC‘s objection to the temporal 
scope of the proceeding.
205
 
With the proceedings set in motion, the Panel held its first meeting 
with the parties in March 2007 and its second meeting in July 2007.
206
  Just 
as in the parallel proceedings, the DS316 Panel notified the parties on four 
occasions that, due to the ―substantive and procedural complexities‖ 
involved in the dispute, it would not be possible for the Panel to complete 
its work within six months of its composition,
207
 before publicly releasing 
its final report on June 30, 2010.
208
  The EC and United States each filed 
appeals,
209
 and after hearings in November and December 2010, the AB 
circulated its report on May 18, 2011.
210
  The DSB adopted the AB report 





203 Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, European Communities and Certain 
Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS347/6 (Oct. 10, 
2006)  The decision by the United States to pursue its original complaint, DS316, while the 
EC ultimately pursued its refiled complaint, DS353, is what caused the two actions, 
originally filed on the same day, to be separated by almost a year. 
204 Lapse of Authority for the Establishment of the Panel, Note by the Secretariat, 
European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large 
Civil Aircraft, WT/DS347/7 (Oct. 9, 2007). 
205 DS316 EC First Written Submission, supra note 32, ¶ 22. 
206 DS316 Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 1.13. 
207 Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, European Communities and Certain 
Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/7 (Apr. 13, 
2006); Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, European Communities and Certain 
Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/9 (Dec. 14, 
2007); Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, European Communities and Certain 
Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/10 (Oct. 20, 
2008); Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, European Communities and Certain 
Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/11 (Dec. 7, 
2009). 
208 DS316 Panel Report, supra note 4. 
209 Notification of an Appeal by the European Union under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of 
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), 
and under Rule 20(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, European 
Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft, WT/DS316/12 (July 23, 2010); Notification of an Other Appeal by the United 
States under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), and under Rule 23(1) of the Working 
Procedures for Appellate Review, European Communities and Certain Member States—
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/13 (Aug. 20, 2010). 
210 DS316 AB Report, supra note 5. 
211 Appellate Body Report and Panel Report, Action by the Dispute Settlement Body, 
European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large 
Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/16 (June 6, 2011). 
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C.  The Panel and AB Findings 
1.  The DS316 Panel and AB Findings 
In the DS316 Panel Report, released on June 30, 2010, the panel found 
a substantial amount of subsidies to Airbus.
212
  The panel held that each of 
the challenged launch aid measures was a specific subsidy under the SCM 
Agreement.
213
  The Panel further held that fourteen of the seventeen 
challenged provisions of infrastructure and infrastructure-related grants 
were specific subsidies, including the provision of manufacturing sites in 
Hamburg and Toulouse, a runway extension at the Bremen Airport in 




In addition, the Panel held in favor of the United States in regard to 
each of the French equity infusions, the majority of the challenged research 
and technological development funding, and the German government‘s 
transfer of its ownership in Deutsche Airbus to the Daimler Group.
215
  It did 
not find, however, that any of the challenged loans by the EIB, though 
subsidies, were specific subsidies.
216
 
Of each of these measures that the Panel found to be specific subsidies, 
the Panel found only the launch aid provisions by three of the four Airbus 
nations to the A380 to be in the category of prohibited subsidies as export 
subsidies.
217
  The remaining launch aid subsidies were not held to be 
contingent on either law or fact upon anticipated export performance, so 
they were not held to be prohibited subsidies.
218
  These remaining launch 
aid subsidies and the rest of the specific subsidies therefore required a 
showing of adverse effects to be actionable.  In this regard, the Panel found 
that the subsidies had caused adverse effects of serious prejudice to the 
United States‘ interests under Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement by 
displacing imports and exports and causing significant lost sales.
219
  The 
Panel noted that ―Airbus‘ market share is directly attributable to its ability 
to sell and deliver to the European Communities and relevant third country 
markets, LCA which it would not have had available but for the subsidies 
which supported the launch of every model of Airbus LCA.‖220  While these 
adverse effects were sufficient to make the subsidies actionable, the Panel 
 
212 DS316 Panel Report, supra note 4. 
213 Id. ¶ 8.1(a)(i). 
214 Id. ¶ 8.1(b). 
215 Id. ¶¶ 8.1(c), (d), (e). 
216 Id. ¶ 8.3(b). 
217 Id. ¶ 8.1(a)(ii). 
218 Id. ¶ 8.3(a). 
219 Id. ¶¶ 8.2, 8.4. 
220 Id. ¶ 7.1985. 
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did not find that the subsidies caused adverse effects of price undercutting, 
suppression, or depression under Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement, or 




The Panel also rejected several of the United States‘ challenges of 
launch aid subsidies for the development of the A350.  The panel did not 
find that any of the nations had committed to launch aid for the A350 as of 
July 2005.
222
  In addition, the Panel rejected the claim that the history of 
launch aid provisions to Airbus aircraft constituted an unwritten launch aid 
program.
223
  These findings are important because they mean that if the 
United States wishes to challenge launch aid for the A350, it will have to 
initiate new proceedings, taking additional time and possibly giving Airbus 
a competitive advantage in the meantime, instead of immediately applying 
countervailing measures as it could have if the measures were determined to 
be part of this proceeding. 
The panel concluded by recommending that ―the subsidizing Member 
granting each subsidy found to be prohibited withdraw it without delay,‖224 
and that ―the Member granting each subsidy found to have resulted in such 
adverse effects ‗take appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects or . . . 
withdraw the subsidy.‘‖225  However, it declined to ―make any suggestions 
concerning steps that might be taken to implement those 
recommendations.‖226  Though the parties sharply disagreed in the press 
over the extent to which the report favored each party‘s positions,227 the 
total amount of illegitimate subsidies adds up to $18 billion by the United 




Both parties filed appeals.
229
  The EC
230
 objected to various 
 
221 Id. ¶ 8.4. 
222 Id. ¶ 8.3(a)(i). 
223 Id. ¶ 8.3(a)(iv). 
224 Id. ¶ 8.6. 
225 Id. ¶¶ 8.7. 
226 Id. ¶ 8.8. 
227 Each party has asserted that the Panel favored them on approximately seventy percent 
of their claims.  Press Release, Airbus, Airbus Alerts on Counter Case on Boeing Subsidies 
while WTO Panel Rejects US Claims, (June 30, 2010), available at http://www.airbus.com/ 
presscentre/pressreleases/press-release-detail/detail/airbus-alerts-on-counter-case-on-boeing-
subsidies-while-wto-panel-rejects-us-claims/; DS 316 WTO Panel Subsidy Findings—
Win/Loss Analysis, BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/aboutus/govt_ops/docs/wto/Win_and_ 
Loss_Analysis.pdf. 
228 Oral Statement of the United States at the First Oral Hearing, European Communities 
and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, ¶ 2, AB-
2010-1/DS316 (Nov. 11, 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2392. 
229 Notification of an Appeal by the European Union under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of 
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), 
and under Rule 20(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, European 
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conclusions of the Panel, primarily relating to whether the launch aid, 
infrastructure measures, and equity infusions constituted specific subsidies, 
and whether those measures were export subsidies or had caused serious 
prejudice.
231
  The United States appealed the Panel‘s conclusions that no 
launch aid program existed that would bring future launch aid to the A350 
into the scope of the complaint, and that the launch aid did not constitute 
prohibited export subsidies except for the A380.
232
 
The AB panel upheld the Panel‘s conclusion that the launch aid 
measures were specific subsidies, but reversed its conclusion that launch aid 
for the A380 constituted an export subsidy, and limited the findings of 
serious prejudice based on displacement.
233
  The AB also reversed Panel 
conclusions as to some of the infrastructure and research and development 
measures,
234
 but upheld findings that certain capital investments and 
research and development programs were specific subsidies.
235
  In addition, 
the AB rejected the United States‘ arguments that certain launch aid 
measures were prohibited export subsidies and held that allegations of a de 
facto launch aid program were outside the terms of reference of the 
Panel.
236
  The AB concluded by recommending that the EC bring its 
measures, as found by the Panel and modified by the AB, into conformity 
with its obligations under the SCM Agreement.
237
 
On December 1, 2011, the EC notified the DSB that it had ―taken 
appropriate steps to bring its measures fully into conformity with its WTO 
obligations, and to comply with the DSB‘s recommendations and rulings,‖ 
and that it had removed all subsidies and adverse effects covered by the 
DSB‘s rulings.238  Specifically, it stated that it had ―secured repayment of 
[Member State Financing (MSF)] loans and terminated MSF agreements, 
 
Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft, WT/DS316/12 (July 21, 2010); Notification of an Other Appeal by the United 
States under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), and under Rule 23(1) of the Working 
Procedures for Appellate Review, European Communities and Certain Member States—
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/13 (Aug. 19, 2010). 
230 Upon the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, the European Union (EU) 
replaced and succeeded the EC before the WTO.  DS316 AB Report, supra note 5, at 1 n.1.  
For continuity sake, though, I refer to the EC rather than the EU. 
231 Id. ¶ 571. 
232 Id. ¶ 572. 
233 Id. ¶ 1414(e), (f), (j), (m), (n). 
234 Id. ¶ 1414(g), (s). 
235 Id. ¶ 1414(f), (h). 
236 Id. ¶ 1415. 
237 Id. ¶ 1418. 
238 Communication from the European Union, European Communities and Certain 
Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/17 (Dec. 1, 
2011). 
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increased fees and lease payments on infrastructure support to accord with 
market principles, and ensured that capital contributions and regional aid 
subsidies . . . are no longer capable of causing adverse effects.‖239  The 
United States disputed, however, that these measures brought the EC into 
compliance, and requested authorization from the DSB to take 
countermeasures totaling between $7 and $10 billion per year in the form of 
a suspension of concessions under GATT and the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS).
240
  The United States also accompanied this 
request with a request for consultations to facilitate resolving the dispute,
241
 
and the WTO later referred the matter back to the original panel, at the 
United States‘ request, to determine compliance.242 
2.  The DS353 Panel and AB Findings 
The DS353 Panel circulated its final report on March 31, 2011.
243
  As 
to subsidies from state and local governments, the Panel found that some of 
the measures from Washington, Kansas, and Illinois, and municipalities 
therein constituted specific subsidies, including tax breaks from 
Washington and Kansas, and a headquarters relocation incentive package 
from Illinois and the City of Chicago.
244
  As to the indirect subsidies, the 
Panel found that various NASA aeronautics research and development 
programs constituted specific subsidies to Boeing in the amount of $2.6 
billion.
245
  The Panel also determined that some of the U.S. Department of 
Defense research and development programs constituted specific 
subsidies.
246
  Of the $45 billion spent by the Department of Defense with 
Boeing over the contested time period, the EC estimated that $2.4 billion 
constituted specific subsidies to LCA, while the United States put that 
number at less than $308 million.
247
  The Panel rejected both numbers, but 
was unable to reach an estimate of its own as to the value of these 
subsidies.
248
  The Panel also rejected allegations of various other subsidies, 
 
239 Id ¶ 4. 
240 Recourse to Article 7.9 of the SCM Agreement and Article 22.2 of the DSU by the 
United States, European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting 
Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/18 (Dec. 9, 2011). 
241 Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, European Communities and 
Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/19 
(Dec. 9, 2011). 
242 Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, Constitution of the Panel, 
Note by the Secretariat, European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures 
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/24 (Apr. 25, 2012). 
243 DS353 Panel Report, supra note 4. 
244 Id. ¶¶ 7.302, 7.303, 7.819, 7.939. 
245 Id. ¶ 7.1110. 
246 Id. ¶ 7.1210. 
247 Id. ¶¶ 7.1203, 7.1204. 
248 Id. ¶¶ 7.1205–7.1207, 7.1210. 
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including research and development contracts from the Department of 




The Panel also found that Boeing received prohibited export subsidies 
under FSC tax benefits in the amount of $2.199 billion, but declined to 
make a recommendation as to those because they were subject to a previous 
WTO adjudication.
250
  As to the remaining specific subsidies, the Panel 
found that some, but not all, of the measures caused the adverse effects of 
serious prejudice to the interests of another member by displacement, 
significant price suppression, and significant lost sales.
251
  The Panel 
concluded by recommending that the United States ―take appropriate steps 
to remove the adverse effects or . . . withdraw‖ these subsidies.252 
U.S. representatives proclaimed victory, claiming that the Panel‘s 
findings of $3 billion in new subsidies,
253
 compared to the $24 billion in 
alleged subsidies, ―amounts to a massive rejection‖ of the EC‘s case,254 one 
that ―pales in comparison to the WTO‘s earlier findings that Airbus 
benefited from illegal subsidies.‖255  Meanwhile, representatives on the 
EC‘s side asserted that the cited subsidies resulted in at least $45 billion in 




The EC and the United States each appealed the report.
257
  The United 
 
249 Id. ¶¶ 7.1257, 7.1312, 7.1375. 
250 Id. ¶¶ 7.1429, 8.6, 8.7. 
251 Id. ¶ 7.1854, 7.1855. 
252 Id. ¶ 8.9. 
253 This number appears to exclude the benefits from FSC tax credits, which the United 
States claims were separately resolved, and also appears to omit benefits from Department of 
Defense contracts, which the Panel determined to be subsidies, but did not quantify.  See 
Press Release, Boeing, Boeing Response to Public Reports Regarding the WTO‘s Interim 
Decision in DS 353 (Sept. 15, 2010), http://boeing.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43 
&item=1423. 
254 Id. 
255 Dominic Gates, WTO‘s Boeing Ruling Could Fuel Subsidy Debate, Make Settlement 
More Difficult, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 15, 2010), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/ 
businesstechnology/2012903753_boeingwto16.html. 
256 Aubrey Cohen, Exec: Illegal Boeing Subsidies Cost Airbus $45 Billion in Sales, 
SEATTLEPI BLOGS (Sept. 21, 2010), http://blog.seattlepi.com/aerospace/archives/ 
222174.asp?from=blog_last3; Aubrey Cohen, Europen [sic] Source: Boeing Subsidies 
Enough to Spur Negotiations, SEATTLE PI BLOGS (Sept. 15, 2010, 1:44 PM), 
http://blog.seattlepi.com/aerospace/archives/221488.asp. 
257 Notification of an Appeal by the European Union under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of 
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), 
and under Rule 20(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, United States – 
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/8 (Apr. 1, 
2011); Notification of an Other Appeal by the United States under Article 16.4 and Article 
17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(DSU), and under Rule 23(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, United 
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States appealed the Panel‘s findings that certain state and local tax benefits 
and aspects of Boeing‘s NASA and Department of Defense contracts 
constituted subsidies.
258
  It also appealed the Panel‘s conclusions as to the 
adverse effects of these measures.
259
  The EC appeal, filed the day after the 
public release of the Panel report, argued that the Panel erred in finding that 
certain transfers of patent rights and purchases of services did not constitute 
subsidies, and that the Panel should have considered the aggregate effect of 
the subsidies in determining their adverse effects.
260
  In its report, the AB 
upheld most of the Panel‘s determinations as to the existence of subsidies, 
though with minor modifications.
261
  It also upheld most of the Panel‘s 
findings regarding adverse effects, also with modifications in each 
direction.
262
  The AB report closed by recommending that the United States 
remove the adverse effects or withdraw the subsidies.
263
  Once again, both 
parties claimed decisive victory.  Airbus derided the 787 Dreamliner as the 
―Subsidy-liner,‖ while the United States claimed that the decision 
established ―that European subsidies to Airbus are far larger—by 
multiples—and more distortive than anything that the United States does 
for Boeing.‖264 
Six months after the DSB‘s adoption of the panel and appellate reports 
on March 23, 2012, the United States proclaimed that it had ―fully complied 
with the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body in 
this dispute.‖265  It stated that NASA and the Department of Defense had 
revised each of the contracts found to be in violation of the SCM 
 
States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), 
WT/DS353/10 (Apr. 28, 2011);. 
258 Notification of an Other Appeal by the United States under Article 16.4 and Article 17 
of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), 
and under Rule 23(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, United States—
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), ¶¶ 1–9, 
WT/DS353/10 (Apr. 28, 2011). 
259 Id. ¶ 10. 
260 Notification of an Appeal by the European Union under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of 
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), 
and under Rule 20(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, United States—
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), ¶¶ 2–3, WT/DS353/8 
(Apr. 1, 2011). 
261 DS353 AB Report, supra note 5. 
262 Id. ¶ 1350(d). 
263 Id. ¶ 1352. 
264 Christopher Drew & Nicola Clark, In Appeal, W.T.O. Upholds a Decision Against 
Boeing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/13/business/global/ 
trade-group-upholds-ruling-on-boeing-subsidies.html; Editorial, Deuling WTO 
Interpretations Beg for Boeing–Airbus Settlement, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 20, 2012, 3:31 
PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/editorials/2017800239_edit21wto.html. 
265 Communication from the United States, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in 
Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/15 (Sept. 23, 2012). 
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Agreement, had revised or terminated other policies and programs, and that 
the state and local measures were no longer in effect.
266
  It additionally 
stated that through these actions, ―any adverse effects of the subsidies in 
question have ceased to exist.‖267  The EC thought otherwise.  On 
September 27, 2012, it requested authorization to impose countermeasures 
against the United States in the amount of $12 billion annually to address 
continuing subsidies and the continuing adverse effects of the covered 
subsidies.
268
  It also requested consultations with the Unites States, the first 
step in adjudicating compliance with the WTO‘s rulings.269 
Thus, although the substantive portions of the dispute resolution 
process have concluded for both the DS316 and DS353 disputes, the 
enforcement stage of the proceedings is just getting underway, meaning the 
ultimate conclusion, if any, could still be years away. 
V.  THE FUTURE OF THE DISPUTE 
Having evaded a meaningful and comprehensive trade agreement in 
the civil aircraft industry for over four decades now, a resolution will not be 
achieved easily, and the resulting agreement is not likely to be painless for 
any party.  With both companies developing new aircraft meant for direct 
competition, the incentives are extremely high to remove any competitive 
advantage the opposing party‘s subsidies may afford it.  The resolution of 
the WTO processes may provide the parties with useful tools to resolve the 
dispute, such as hard information as to each other‘s subsidies programs, and 
possibly the threat of trade retaliation if the party does not comply with the 
panel recommendations.  Still, many factors will continue to work against a 
comprehensive agreement to eliminate, or at least more stringently limit, 
subsidies. 
A.  Challenges to Reaching a Resolution 
First, there is a basic difference of ideas between Europe and the 
United States on the role of government in the market that has manifested 
itself throughout the history of the dispute.
270
  While Boeing began through 
entrepreneurship and has grown largely absent direct government aid, 




268 Recourse to Article 22.2 of the DSU, and Articles 4.10 and 7.9 of the SCM 
Agreement, by the European Union, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/17 (Sept. 27, 2012). 
269 Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Union, Request for 
Consultations, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), WT/DS353/16 (Sept. 25, 2012). 
270 Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 1, at 195–97. 





  Resolving the dispute may require setting aside, or at least 
putting on the table, each party‘s traditional understanding and philosophy 
as to the role of government in industry.  This difference is also reflected in 
the types of subsidies the parties have provided, with Europe giving direct 
subsidies to Airbus in the form of launch aid and the United States 
subsidizing Boeing more indirectly through government contracts and tax 
breaks.
272
  This difference in the two parties‘ approaches will create an 
additional obstacle to an agreement because the different types of subsidies 
and the different effects they have on the market prevent a direct 
comparison between the two parties‘ subsidies.  Instead, the differences will 
allow additional room for argument as to the comparative effects and 
permissibility of the respective programs and will require the parties to 
haggle over the limitations to be set on each form of subsidy rather than 
setting a single standard applicable to both parties.
273
 
In addition, the importance and prominence of the LCA industry to 
both parties will cause them to jealously guard any advantage they can 
secure.  Civil aviation is the largest export industry in the United States, and 
Boeing is the largest exporting manufacturer in the United States and the 
world.
274
  Airbus also occupies a similar stature in Europe.
275
  Even a slight 
advantage, when multiplied by the massive size of the LCA industry, could 
lead to significant economic benefits for the subsidizing party, so neither 
the United Sates nor the EC will lightly give up any advantage it can gain.  
Aside from competitive advantages, though, Airbus‘ success has obviated 
the need for continued subsidies to overcome the barriers to entry in the 
civil aircraft industry,
276
 and has greatly diminished the difference between 
the terms of the launch aid and the financing that it would be able to obtain 
in an arms-length transaction on the open market,
277
 which may help 
facilitate a resolution. 
In addition to domestic economies, each party has defense issues to 
consider in resolving the dispute.  With many of the challenged subsidies to 
 
271 See supra Part II. 
272 Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 1, at 196–97; see supra Part IV. 
273 See EU/US Agreement on Terms for Negotiation to End Subsidies for Large Civil 
Aircraft: Questions and Answers, EUR. COMMISSION (Jan. 11, 2005), http://trade.ec.europa. 
eu/doclib/docs/2007/april/tradoc_134261.pdf. 
274 Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 1, at 195–96. 
275 Id. 
276 An Ill-Timed Spat: A Transatlantic Row (Again) Over Aircraft Subsidies Could 
Jeopardise the Global Trade Talks, ECONOMIST (Mar. 23, 2005), http://www.economist. 
com/node/3789454; Phillip Swagel, Boeing vs. Airbus: An Examination of the Issues, AM. 
ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUB. POL‘Y RES. (Mar. 16, 2005), http://www.aei.org/EMStaticPage/ 
1028?page=Summary; see also CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 17, at 2-1 to 2-2 
(emphasizing access to capital as a critical barrier to entry in the LCA market). 
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Boeing involving defense and government contracts,
278
 the United States 
may be hesitant to restructure its defense spending to comply with the WTO 
rulings.  Both companies also have substantial military components, and the 




One additional complication to resolving the dispute is that the LCA 
industry may not be limited to the Airbus–Boeing duopoly for much longer.  
As many as five other nations have ambitions in the LCA industry, 
beginning at the small end with single-aisle aircraft, including China, 
Russia, Japan, Canada, and Brazil.
280
  Regional jet makers, primarily 
Canada‘s Bombardier and Brazil‘s Embraer, are increasingly competing at 
the small end of the LCA market.
281
  Bombardier expects to introduce a 
new series of aircraft in 2013 with a seating capacity somewhat below that 
of the 737 and A320.
282
  Brazil is currently the world‘s third largest 
 
278 Details of the US Subsidies to Boeing Challenged by the EU, EUR. COMMISSION (Sept. 
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279 The subsidies dispute became a significant point of contention, at least among 
politicians and in the media, in the awarding of a contract by the United States Air Force to 
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Politicians Pivot WTO Ruling to Air Force Tanker Fight, SEATTLEPI (June 30, 2010, 9:51 
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Against Boeing, THE HILL (Sept. 15, 2010, 5:28 PM), http://thehill.com/news-by-
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fight-against-boeing; WTO Penalties on the Tanker? Let‘s Talk About This, LEEHAM NEWS & 
COMMENT (Feb. 1, 2011), http://leehamnews.wordpress.com/2011/02/01/wto-penalties-on-
the-tanker-lets-talk-about-this/.  Both Boeing and Airbus submitted bids, each basing the 
proposed tanker on one of its civil aircraft, and the contract was ultimately awarded to 
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TIMES (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/05/business/global/05tanker. 
html?src=busln. 
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Steal Some of Boeing‘s Business, HERALDNET (Nov. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Hungry for 
More], http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20101118/BIZ/711189963/1005; Michelle Dunlop, 
A Host of Challengers to 737‘s Throne, HERALDNET (Nov. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Host of 
Challengers], http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20101121/BIZ/311219999/1010/BIZ01; 
Brazil Eyes Boeing, Airbus Aviation Market, UPI (Nov. 29, 2010, 5:11 PM) [hereinafter 
Brazil Eyes Boeing], http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2010/11/ 
29/Brazil-eyes-Boeing-Airbus-aviation-market/UPI-86421291068679/ (―The aviation 
duopoly of Airbus and Boeing is about the change forever.‖); P.C., The Dubai Airshow: The 
Russians are Coming—and the Chinese and the Canadians, Gulliver, ECONOMIST (Nov. 14, 
2011, 11:10 AM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2011/11/dubai-air-show. 
281 Marc. L. Busch, Testimony of Marc L. Busch to the House Aviation Subcommittee 
(May 25, 2005), http://www.aei.org/speech/100121; Hungry for More, supra note 280. 
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producer of commercial aircraft,
283
 and Embraer also competes at the small 
end of the 737/A320 market and may be looking to expand.
284
  More 
importantly in the long term, Comac, the state-owned Commercial Aircraft 
Corporation of China, has a new aircraft under development.
285
  The C919, 
seating 166 and set to enter service in 2016, will compete directly against 
the 737 and A320.
286
  This is particularly significant because demand for 
aircraft in China is projected to exceed 4,000 aircraft over the next twenty 
years.
287
  These entrants to the narrow-body market, which currently 
accounts for around sixty percent of the LCA market and is dominated by 
the 737 and A320,
288
 pose serious threats to the continued dominance of 
Airbus and Boeing over the LCA market. 
With this competition looming, neither the United States nor the EC 
will be eager to agree to limits on its own activities that will not apply to or 
be enforced vis-à-vis its emerging competitors.
289
  While the long term will 
likely require a pluri- or multilateral agreement among the LCA players, 
adding additional parties to the already highly complex negotiations 
between the United States and the EC could be counterproductive.
290
  
Because of this, the parties may be content at this time to let the current 
WTO rulings serve as a precedent on LCA subsidies.
291
 
B.  Potential Resolutions 
Despite these complications, the parties will likely need to return to the 
negotiating table to reach an agreement limiting subsidies and resolving the 
WTO dispute.  Full and immediate compliance with the WTO rulings by 
 
283 Brazil Eyes Boeing, supra note 280. 
284 Id.; Host of Challengers, supra note 280; GLENNON J. HARRISON, CONGRESSIONAL 
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ISSUES FOR COMPETITIVENESS 29–30 (2011), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41925.pdf. 
285 Host of Challengers, supra note 280; Liza Lin, China‘s First Passenger Plane Stokes 
Pride, Wins Initial Sales, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/2010-11-17/china-s-first-passenger-plane-stokes-pride-wins-initial-sales.html. 
286 Host of Challengers, supra note 280; Lin, supra note 285. 
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289 See Press Release, Airbus, Statement by Airbus President and CEO Tom Enders in 
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Subsidies Case (DS 353) (July 8, 2010) http://www.airbus.com/presscentre/pressreleases/ 
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290 See LONG-TERM VIABILITY, supra note 80, at 42–45. 
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Aircraft Battle Ruling, CHINA POST (JAN. 31, 2011, 11:41 PM) http://www.chinapost.com. 
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either party is highly doubtful because, as in other high-profile WTO 
disputes, the high stakes in the LCA industry give little incentive for prompt 
compliance, and determining how to become compliant would be very 
difficult even for a party inclined to do so, due to the complexity of the 
case.
292
  Absent a negotiated agreement, then, each party would be left to 
whatever remedies the DSU entitles it to coerce compliance from the 
opposing party.  This would likely take the form of a suspension of 
concessions, since compensation—a trade concessions benefit to the 
prevailing party by the party subject to the complaint—must be offered by 
the noncompliant party, and is therefore quite unlikely.
293
 
The fact that the United States has been much less insistent on 
returning to the bargaining table than the EC throughout the WTO 
process
294
 may indicate that the United States is content with the SCM 
Agreement as it stands, and with the remedies that the SCM Agreement and 
DSU will entitle it.  However, the large amount of subsidies found on both 
sides means that absent full compliance or a negotiated solution, each party 
would be able to impose massive trade sanctions against a wide range of 
industries of the opposing party.
295
  While this may resolve the instant 
dispute in the WTO, it could also inflict significant harm on the imposing 
party‘s domestic consumers, as well as industries of the opposing party 
unrelated to the LCA industry.
296
  It would also be limited to the current 
dispute, leaving the parties back at square one the next time subsidies come 
up—for the A350, for example.  Additionally, if such an arrangement is 
unacceptable to the EC, the dispute would likely just spill over into the 
already fragile and stalemated Doha Round of WTO negotiations.
297
 
If a negotiated agreement is reached, one distinct possibility is that it 
will be along the same lines as the 1992 Bilateral Agreement: rather than 
establishing a comprehensive framework eliminating aircraft subsidies, 
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with the Panel and AB rulings.  Recourse to Article 7.9 of the SCM Agreement and Article 
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each party may agree to just enough concessions to address its immediate 
concerns and to keep the other from imposing any trade sanctions to which 
the WTO decisions may entitle them.  These concessions would likely take 
the form of limiting or eliminating subsidies to the A350 and the 787, 
which have been the most pressing concerns for the parties, and setting 
slightly more restrictive limits on direct and indirect aid.  Such a limited 
agreement would be short-sighted and a missed opportunity, though.  As the 
1992 agreement demonstrated, such an agreement would be no more than a 
stop-gap measure and would likely bring the parties back to the same 
situation not too many years down the road. 
Instead of settling for this option, the parties should return to the 
negotiating table with the goal of ending all subsidies to the LCA 
industry.
298
  The United States has insisted on the goal of eliminating 
subsidies as to launch aid,
299
 but has yet to do the same with its own indirect 
subsidies.  The EC has preferred a more measured approach, but has 




The agreement should ban all production and development subsidies, 
which would include any launch aid measures provided at terms that would 
not be available on the market.  The EC has decreasing incentive to 
maintain such programs anyway, as their benefit to Airbus over private 
alternatives has decreased with Airbus‘ success,301 and the rationales that 
previously supported the EC‘s subsidies to Airbus to allow it to overcome 
barriers to entry are no longer applicable.
302
  The agreement should also ban 
all indirect subsidies received through preferential contracts or access to 
government facilities or intellectual property at no or reduced cost.  In 
doing so, it should also carefully define how such subsidies are determined 
and calculated, so as to avoid the conflict over the definition of indirect 
 
298 Determining how to address the lingering effects of past or present subsidies is a 
potential impediment to reaching such an agreement.  However, the WTO process provides 
the parties with remedies to address precisely these effects should they be unable to reach an 
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have already eliminated the subsidies or removed their adverse effects in order to comply 
with the WTO ruling.  Communication from the European Union, European Communities 
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WT/DS316/17 (Dec. 1, 2011). 
301 See supra notes 276–277 and accompanying text. 
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(Oct. 20, 2004), http://www.aei.org/article/21412. 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 32:569 (2012) 
606 
subsidies that plagued the bilateral agreement.
303
  Finally, as with the 
bilateral agreement, the agreement should call for a regular exchange of 
information in order to dispel suspicion and incentivize compliance. 
Such an agreement would have much more staying power than an 
agreement that stopped short of eliminating subsidies within the LCA 
industry.  An agreement that limited but did not eliminate subsidies would 
create perpetual haggling over the comparative effects of the direct and 
indirect subsidies, and cause a party to cry foul any time that party‘s 
industry became disadvantaged relative to the other.  In addition, this 
agreement would give both parties additional credibility in potentially 
seeking enforcement against any subsidies their emerging competitors may 
utilize, or in future talks to multilateralize the treaty, which should be the 
ultimate goal. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Since the creation of Airbus over four decades ago, the United States 
and the EC have disputed over subsidies in the civil aircraft industry.  This 
dispute was the subject of negotiations between the parties over much of 
that time without achieving any agreement that suitably addressed the 
concerns of the parties before reaching a head and finally devolving to the 
current all-out litigation in the WTO.  After eight years, the WTO process is 
finally nearing an end and the parties will be able to return to the 
negotiating table to again attempt to produce an agreement.  The history of 
the dispute suggests that the current struggle will result in a patchwork 
agreement to address the parties‘ more immediate interests in their new 
aircraft.  However, the parties should resist the temptation to reach such a 
limited agreement and should instead take advantage of the information and 
leverage that the exhausting WTO process has provided them to make an 
agreement addressing the civil aircraft industry as a whole and eliminating 
subsidies to the maximum extent possible. 
 
303 See supra note 91. 
